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ARTICLE
Terrorism, the Constitution, and the Courts
Jay Shapiro*

One of the few areas of second-guessing that the Bush Administration's war on terrorism has encountered has come from legal
scholars and others who have objected to certain provisions of the
PatriotAct' that relate to criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Arguments have been proffered that constitutional rights of individuals will be sacrificed in the name of protecting America from
further acts of violence. These contentions have been met with a
number of responses. Many have said that the events of September
11th have changed the world, and changed America, and one of the
necessary adaptations requires that people in our country, and
those about to enter it, must live with the increased precautions that
have been deemed necessary.
There is also the view that to the extent the weight of the investigations and prosecutions will fall on foreign nationals, some of
whom are in the United States in violation of immigration laws,
these individuals should not be granted the full panoply of constitutional protections. The questions become more complex when one
considers that the investigations that are underway may require
that the arm of law enforcement reaches beyond our borders and
into foreign lands.
In reality, while concerns about the PatriotAct may have focused the debate, they did not start it. For some time now, the federal government has been investigating terrorism both at home and
abroad. In at least two opinions written by a district court judge in
the Southern District of New York issues concerning the constitutional implications of government conduct towards suspected terrorists have been addressed.
Those decisions demonstrate that the arguments, both for and
against aggressive enforcement, neglect to consider one critical factor in the equation of laws: the role of an independent judiciary.
Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.
*
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While the politicians in the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government propose policies and enact laws aimed at antiterrorism efforts, it will ultimately be left to the judges to interpret
both the constitutionality of those laws and their enforcement. An
examination of judicial precedent over the years should provide
comfort that, even in the face of a nation confronted with enemies
bent on criminal activity, those left with the responsibility of ensuring that those laws comport with basic constitutional rights will respond with reason and justice.
This article presents a review of these recent federal opinions
that have addressed the application of the Fourth Amendment and
Fifth Amendment to extraterritorial conduct on the part of United
States criminal investigators in the name of national security.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Usama Bin Laden and numerous associates were charged in
the Southern District of New York with bombings of American
property on foreign soil and other related acts of terrorism. In a
decision dated February 16, 20012, District Court Judge Leonard
Sand addressed the claims of two of the defendants, who had been
interrogated in Africa, that statements they made to investigators
from the United States should be suppressed. The rulings of that
court and the rationale underlying the decisions clearly demonstrate that even in the face of terrorism the Fifth Amendment will
dictate the admissibility of statements in an American court.
The first of the defendants was Al-'Owhali, who was arrested
on August 12, 1998, by Kenyan police officers from the Criminal
Investigation Division of the National Police accompanied by a FBI
agent and a New York City Police Detective. The arrest was for
violating a Kenyan law that related to carrying identification papers. Al-'Owhali, who spoke English to a limited extent, was
brought to a government facility and he was advised of his rights by
the detective, who used a standard form employed by United States
law enforcement officers operating abroad. These are those rights:
We are representatives of the United States Government. Under our laws, you have certain rights.
Before we ask you any questions, we want to be sure
that you understand those rights.
2 United States v. Bin Laden, et al., 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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You do not have to speak to us or answer any
questions. Even if you have already spoken to the
Kenyan authorities, you do not have to speak to us
now.
If you do speak with us, anything that you say may
be used against you in a court in the United States or
elsewhere.
In the United States, you would have the right to
talk to a lawyer to get advice before we ask you any
questions and you could have a lawyer with you during
questioning. In the United States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you
wish, before any questioning.
Because we are not in the United States, we cannot ensure that you will have a lawyer appointed for
you before any questioning.
If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time.
You should also understand that if you decide not
to speak with us, that fact cannot be used as evidence
against you in a court in the United States.
The rights were read slowly to the suspect, who signed an alias
in Arabic at the bottom portion of the form which read:
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are.
I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand
and know what I am doing. No promises or threats
have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of
3
any kind has been used against me.
Al-'Owhali was then questioned for approximately an hour.
However, another interrogation section was scheduled for the afternoon. Because of a concern that Al-'Owhali did not fully understand the rights, they were read again, but this time they were
translated by an Arabic interpreter. Al-'Owhali indicated that he
knew that the rights were the same as had been given to him in the
3

Id. at 173-174.
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morning session, that he understood them, and again agreed to
speak with the investigators.
Al-'Owhali was questioned for several hours on the first day of
his incarceration in Kenya, and then on and off over the next week
or so. On the four dates of interrogation following the 12th, he was
initially referred to the initial form that he had signed waiving his
rights, and then asked whether he would allow further questioning
to take place. The investigators from the joint terrorism task force
handled the interrogations; however, on August 22 a new and significant figure entered into the proceedings. This was an Assistant
United States Attorney (AUSA) assigned to the embassy bombing
investigation.
The AUSA presented to the suspect a document, a memorandum of understanding, that evinced the intention to try to bring him
to the United States to stand trial. This was a condition that Al'Owhali had asked for in exchange for revealing all that he knew
about the bombing. Once the memorandum was described, the
AUSA advised Al-'Owhali of his Miranda rights from memory, and
adapted those rights to fit the precise situation of the interrogation.
In that regard, the following advice was given concerning counsel:
AUSA [redacted] told Al-'Owhali that he had the right
to remain silent; that he had the right "to have an attorney present during this meeting;" that even if Al'Owhali decided to talk he could always change his
mind later; that Al-'Owhali's statements could be used
against him in court, though the fact of his silence
could not. AUSA [redacted] also said that he was an
attorney for the U.S. government, not for Al-'Owhali.
It was repeatedly stressed to Al-'Owhali that he was
the "boss" at all times as to whether he wished to answer questions without a lawyer present. AUSA [redacted] told Al-'Owhali that there was no American
attorney currently available for him in Kenya.
After these rights were read, and following a further discussion concerning Al-'Owhali's desire to be tried in the United States, the interrogation resumed. It was at that time that Al-'Owhali finally
4
acknowledged his participation in the bombing in Kenya.
4

Id. at 176-177.
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The second set of statements that was addressed in Judge
Sand's opinion were those of K.K. Mohamed, who was arrested in
South Africa as a result of the embassy bombings. Mohamed was
arrested by South African authorities, who were working along with
a special agent of the FBI, and was informed by the South African
investigators of his rights under that country's law: he did not have
to speak, anything that he did say could be used against him, and he
was entitled to an attorney. 5
United States agents were then given the opportunity to question Mohamed. Their inquiry was preceded by the reading in English and translation into Mohamed's native Swahili of an
advisement of rights that was the same used in the questioning of
Al-'Owhali.
The facts that the questioning of both of these men took place
on foreign soil, and that neither man was a citizen nor did they live
in the United States, did not deter Judge Sand from concluding that
the privilege against self-incrimination applied to their statements.
This rule against self-incrimination applies to all defendants tried in
American courts, notwithstanding their minimal connection to the
United States. The only connection needed, in fact, is the one that
invariably would bring such an issue to the forefront: the attempted
use of a statement in an American courtroom. The district court
noted that in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez6 , the Supreme
Court made it quite clear that a Fifth Amendment violation was
one which occurred at trial, and not at the time a statement is obtained. As Judge Sand saw it, "any violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination occurs, not at the moment law enforcement officials coerce statements through custodial interrogation, but when a
defendant's involuntary statements are actually used against him at
'7
an American criminal proceeding."
Once Judge Sand concluded that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was applicable to the statements by
those questioned abroad who ultimately become defendants in the
United States, he determined that "a principled but realistic application of Miranda's familiar warning/waiver framework, in the absence of a constitutionally-adequate alternative, is both necessary
5
6
7

Id. at 180.
494 U.S. 259, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990).
132 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
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and appropriate under the Fifth Amendment." 8 The judge emphasized that the necessity for the warnings may be even greater in
foreign lands where there may be frequent instances where the conditions of interrogation that exist prior to the arrival of American
law enforcement agents may be very coercive.
Nevertheless, Judge Sand had to resolve the practicalities of
questioning abroad with the precepts of Miranda because "Miranda
does not require law enforcement to promise that which they cannot guarantee or that which is in fact impossible to fulfill." 9 Therefore, the judge found that the "fair and correct approach" 10 was for
the American questioners to inform the suspect of the right to
counsel and, in light of the particular circumstances that they are in,
"the possible impediments to its exercise."'" In other words, the
American law enforcement agents must candidly inform the suspects of the state of the availability of counsel in the country in
which the questioning is taking place.
In light of this reading, the court found that the advisement of
rights form used when Al-'Owhali and Mohamed were questioned
was deficient. That form clearly gave the suspects the impression
that the right to counsel was available in the United States, but was
limited in that they "are not in the United States" so "we cannot
ensure that you will have a lawyer appointed for you before any
questioning." 12 That statement was inaccurate because it was indeed possible, both in Kenya and South Africa, for the two suspects
to consult with attorneys. Not only did the law of both countries
permit the protection of counsel, but the two men had the where13
withal to obtain attorneys.
Still, in the end, Judge Sand found that there were reasons to
admit at least some of the statements made by these suspects.
When the AUSA read Al-'Owhali his rights he was told that he had
the right to an attorney and that the only limitation was that no
American lawyer was available at that time. Consequently, Al'Owhali was not told that he would be refused access to counsel.
Therefore, Al-'Owhali's statements made after he met the AUSA
were held to be admissible.
Id. at 186-187.
9 Id. at 188.
10 Id.
8

11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.

at 190.
at 191.
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Mohamed's statements were admissible from the start, simply
because he was told at the outset that under South African law he
had the right to counsel if he wanted to consult with one. As a
result, the court found that the deficiencies in the advisement of
rights form used by the Americans was cured even before it was
read.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fifth Amendment analysis by Judge Sand concerning the
admissibility of statements applies to statements of common
criminals as well as terrorists. The court's focus was the violation of
the Fifth Amendment, one that occurs at the time that a statement
is offered into evidence in an American courtroom. Naturally, the
question will arise concerning the application of the Fourth Amendment, where a violation of that provision takes place at the time of
the illegal search or seizure.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,14 the Supreme Court analyzed, in the context of searches abroad, the protections of the
Fourth Amendment and who it protects. Verdugo-Urquidez was a
Mexican drug kingpin, who was arrested in that country and then
taken to the United States for prosecution. Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency, working with Mexican law enforcement,
searched two of Verdugo-Urquidez's residences in Mexico and
seized inculpatory evidence. The products of these warrantless
searches were suppressed by the district court, a ruling that was up15
held by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court reversed that ruling. In its analysis, the
Court noted a significant distinction between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Just as Judge Sand in Bin Laden wrote that the violation created by the deficient rights contained in the AOR takes
place when the evidence is offered in court, the Supreme Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez held that the violation of the rules surrounding
search and seizure occurs when the government searches.1 6 Nevertheless, the Court did not conclude that the fact that the violation
took place abroad obviates Fourth Amendment coverage. Instead,
the Court considered the question of the application of the Fourth
Amendment to persons outside of the United States. The Court
14

15
16

See note 6, supra.
856 F.2d 1214 (1988).
494 U.S. at 264.
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looked to the plain language of the amendment and concluded that
it protects "the people" from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and that it therefore did not apply to someone who was not a
United States citizen and otherwise had no other connection with
17
our nation.
The clear implication of Verdugo-Urquidez was that the Fourth
Amendment applies to citizens of the United States even when they
are not on American soil. How that amendment applies to American citizens involved in terrorist activities is an important question
in our times, and once again, it was Judge Sand who had to develop
an answer in the context of the terrorism prosecution of Usama Bin
Laden and one of his associates.
One of the opinions issued in that case had to do with a suppression motion filed by Wadih El-Hage, an American citizen.' 8
The location that was searched was El-Hage's residence in Kenya.
As Judge Sand described it, the search was part of a lengthy United
States effort to gather intelligence on members of Usama Bin
Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist organization. By the summer of 1996,
the investigative techniques employed included electronic surveillance of numerous telephones in Kenya, including some associated
with El-Hage. By the following Spring, the Attorney General of
the United States permitted the investigators to focus intelligence
gathering on El-Hage and on August 21, 1997, his home was
searched by Kenyan and American agents. Although the Kenyans
had a warrant that authorized the search for stolen property the
Americans did not use that warrant as a justification for their
search.19
As part of his defense to his prosecution with other al-Qaeda
associates, El-Hage moved to suppress the fruits of the wiretaps
and the search. His challenge was based upon two arguments: 1)
the searches were conducted without warrants; and 2) even if warrants were not necessary, they still violated the Fourth Amendment
because they were unreasonable. The government's position was
that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to the searches because they "were primarily conducted for
the purpose of foreign intelligence collection. '20 In describing the
17

Id. at 265.

18 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

19 Id. at 269.
20 Id. at 270.
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importance of the matters before him, Judge Sand wrote that they
raised:
..significant issues of first impression concerning the
applicability of the full panoply of the Fourth Amendment to searches conducted abroad by the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes and which are
directed at an American citizen believed to be an agent
of a foreign power . . . we believe this to be the first
case to raise the question whether an American citizen
acting abroad on behalf of a foreign power may invoke
the Fourth Amendment, and especially its warrant provision, to suppress evidence obtained by the United
States in connection with its intelligence gathering
operations. 2 1
The applicability of the Fourth Amendment to these searches was
clear to the court. Judge Sand relied on Verdugo-Urquidez along
with another Supreme Court case, Reid v. Covert22 , for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment, at least to some extent, provides
protections for American citizens whose property is searched
outside of the nation's borders. It was the breadth of that protection, however, that became the crux of the issue in this case.
The Government's primary contention was that "searches conducted for the purpose of foreign intelligence collection which target persons who are agents of a foreign power do not require a
warrant. '23 In its evaluation of this claim, the court broke down the
justifications for an exception to the warrant requirement. First, it
recognized that the Attorney General, acting as a member of the
Executive Branch, was implementing an aspect of Presidential
power: the intelligence gathering related to the President's authority over foreign affairs. The court accepted that "[w]arrantless foreign intelligence gathering has been an established practice of the
24
Executive Branch for decades.1
Next, the court examined precedent through which "several
cases direct that when the imposition of a warrant requirement
proves to be a disproportionate and perhaps even disabling burden
21
22
23
24

Id.
354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 2222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957).
126 F. Supp. 2d 264 at 271.
Id. at 273.
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on the Executive, a warrant should not be required. '25 Essentially,
this argument, which was accepted by the court, emphasizes that
the judiciary is not the best branch of government to be in control
over matters of foreign intelligence collection. The practices involved in garnering intelligence are intertwined with sensitive issues
of foreign policy, many of which involve matters of extreme
confidentiality.
These concerns brought the court to the conclusion that in light
of potential for judicial interference with the executive branch's foreign intelligence operations, judicial involvement should not precede the search, but instead, courts should "assess the
constitutionality of the searches ex post. Requiring judicial approval in advance .. would inevitably mean costly increases in the
' '26
response time of the Executive Branch.
The third consideration in assessing the need for a warrant for
searches such as the one before the court focused upon statutory
authority, or actually, lack thereof, for such a practice. The court
observed that Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not permit a federal magistrate to expand jurisdiction for
search warrants beyond the United States. In addition, application
of traditional warrant practices to the exercise of foreign intelligence gathering would place an undue strain upon that very special
system, because "the people and agencies upon whom the Executive relies in the foreign intelligence context for information and
cooperation would undoubtedly be wary of any warrant procedures
that did not adequately protect sensitive foreign intelligence
information.

'27

After reviewing these "concerns" the court concluded that it
was necessary to find that a foreign intelligence exception exists to
the warrant requirement when searches are conducted abroad and
those searches are targeting foreign powers or their agents. In rela-

tion to El-Hage, the court made the following findings in applying
the exception. First, it recognized that al-Qaeda was a foreign
power and that information provided to the court (through classified documents) established that El-Hage was one of its agents. 28
Next, it turned to the question of the primary motivation for the
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.

at 275.
at 277.
at 277-278.
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searches. Even though the evidence obtained from the searches
was used in a criminal prosecution, the court noted that "[a] foreign
intelligence collection effort that targets the acts of terrorists is
29
likely to uncover evidence of crime."
In finding that the efforts surrounding El-Hage were centered
on foreign intelligence and not a criminal investigation, the court
pointed out that there was no FBI agent involved in the electronic
surveillance and that the searches and other surveillance were focused upon gathering information about al-Qaeda covert operations, including identity fraud and communications between
members of al-Qaeda. In fact, a report found in El-Hage's computer contained inculpatory information concerning one his associates and that person's involvement in a 1993 terrorist attack on
30
American troops in Somalia.
However, the application of the exception hit a snag when it
came to the electronic surveillance that predated the Attorney
General's authorization of April 4, 1997. The last element of the
court's exception to the warrant requirement was executive approval. This approval was not in place for the first ten months of
the electronic surveillance. The government attempted to avoid the
application of the court's analysis by claiming that the interceptions
of El-Hage's conversations were only "incidental" to interceptions
of primary targets of intelligence gathering. 31 However, acceptance
of this view would have to be based upon a finding that El-Hage
was an unanticipated interceptee. This was too difficult a claim for
the court to accept when it came to El-Hage's home and cellular
telephones.
As a result of this analysis, the court was left with a portion of
the searches, those which came before the Attorney General's authorizations, that was unlawful. 32 Nevertheless, the court found that
there was no point to suppress that evidence by virtue of the exclusionary rule. The court applied the traditional considerations of deterrence and good faith to these facts. As to the former, the court
concluded that deterrence was not an issue when it came to these
searches because they were not performed by the FBI for law enforcement purposes, but rather by other agents of the government
29

Id. at 278.

Id. at 279.
31 Id. at 279-280.
32 Id. at 281-282.
30

200

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVIII

who would have conducted the searches "even if there had been an
awareness that the material recorded would be inadmissible at a
''33
future criminal trial of El-Hage.
On the question of good faith, the court was convinced that the
agents who conducted the electronic surveillance "operated under
an actual and reasonable belief that Attorney General approval was
not required prior to April 4, 1997, when El-Hage was specifically
identified by the Government as a target of foreign intelligence collection. ' 34 In light of the minimal precedential guidance in this
area, the court found that there were no illegal motives on the part
of those who were conducting the surveillance.
Still, the Fourth Amendment does not stop with the warrant
requirement, so the court had to continue its inquiry. Even when a
search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, as
these searches did, it still must be "reasonable. ' 35 Although this is
a concept that provides is more flexibility in the admission of
searches when compared to the admissibility of statements, the burden was high in this case in light of the types of searches that were
being challenged: the search of a residence and electronic
surveillance.
Nevertheless, the court refused to accept EI-Hage's position
that the warrantless search of his home was per se unreasonable.
Instead, the court concluded that the search of his home was justified by the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, and that it was conducted in a reasonable manner: "[t]he
scope of the search was limited to those items which were believed
to have foreign intelligence value and retention and dissemination
of the evidence acquired during the search were minimized. '36
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the electronic surveillance was unreasonable because it was conducted without limitation on all of El-Hage's conversations and those of his family for
over one year. The court found that this surveillance was justified
because of the broad, world wide network that was the subject of
the intelligence-gathering, the use of foreign language and probable

Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 285.
33
34
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use of coded communications, and the fact that the phones were
37
actually shared by various members of the al-Qaeda network.
This total, comprehensive analysis resulted in the court's ultimate conclusion that the motion to suppress evidence should be denied without a hearing.
CONCLUSION

In each of these decisions Judge Sand paved new ground, although the recent changes in the world surely suggest that he will
not be the last jurist to address these issues. Moreover, while he
was confronted with new and unusually complex matters, the foundations for his legal conclusions came from many long established
building blocks. He was able to bring together support for his conclusions from many earlier federal decisions.
Additionally, there are other cases dealing with analogous concepts that will surely prove useful in future opinions concerning
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues and the investigation
and prosecution of suspected terrorists. For example, more than
twenty-five years ago Justice Friendly, writing in a concurring opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, commented on
the necessity for airport searches when he noted that:
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human
lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the
pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger
alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the
search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of
preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance
notice to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.3 8
Those statements were made in support of the use of a profile
by airport employees to identify potential hijackers. 39 Clearly, if
the courts approved searches based upon those types of security
measures twenty-five years ago then the events of last September
will support even more intrusive precautions.
Id. at 286.
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972).
39 See also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding
search of carry-on baggage at airport).
37

38
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While Judge Sand's ultimate rulings permitted the use of the
challenged statements and seized evidence, that evidence first had
to undergo substantial scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster. An important part of the history of the judiciary is its role as a
bulwark against overreaching government activity in the realm of
search and seizure, even when that official conduct is done in the
name of national security. In an explanation of the Fourth Amendment's role, Justice Brandeis wrote
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feeling and of his intellect.., they sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
40
civilized men.
This phrase has often been cited in dissenting and majority
opinions to justify the views of judges that the government must, for
the sake of the people, be subjected to limitations in its conduct.
Still, when excesses occur within the United States in the name
of national security, that banner does not preclude the courts from
evaluating those searches within the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment. In United States v. District Court41 the Supreme
Court was confronted with electronic surveillance used in the investigation of a bombing of the office of the Central Intelligence
Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The Court held that the domestic
use of electronic surveillance without prior judicial approval for the
purpose of national security, when not targeting a foreign power, is
42
not legal.
In coming to this conclusion, the Court evaluated many of the
same questions that Judge Sand had to address when he decided the
search issues described above. However, the critical distinction be40 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. Ed.
944 (1928).
41 407 U.S. 297, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972).
42 See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411
(1985) (holding that the Attorney General of the United States was not absolutely
immune from civil liability due to the use of illegal electronic surveillance in the
name of national security).
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tween the Supreme Court's ruling in United States and Judge Sand's
assessment of the foreign searches in El-Hage's case is that Judge
Sand was dealing with a foreign power.
There is no doubt that government investigators will continue
to pursue leads in the fight against terrorism. 4 3 More and more
prosecutions will develop and it is likely that law enforcement will
maintain its aggressive posture in these investigations. In the end,
however, it will be the courts that have the opportunity to pass on
the legality of the government's conduct, and thereby have the final
word on the viability of these prosecutions. As the cases described
above clearly demonstrate, the courts will have ample constitutional authority to guide them.

43 See e.g. United States v. Awadallah, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1430 (January
31, 2002) (describing a perjury prosecution involving a person questioned within 10
days of the September 11, 2001. attacks).

